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Abstract
We study the behavior of the US labor share over the past 90 years. We find that the
observed decline of the labor share is entirely explained by the capitalization of intellectual
property products in the national income and product accounts.
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1 Introduction
After carefully analyzing the most recent national income and fixed assets data, we show that
the secular decline of the labor share (LS), an observation that motivates a growing body of
research on factor income shares (Elsby et al., 2013, Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014), is entirely
driven by the recent capitalization of intellectual property products (IPP) in the national income
and product accounts (NIPA). The capitalization of IPP—previously treated as intermediate
nondurable consumption in the business sector and final consumption in nonprofit institutions
serving households (NPISH) and general government—is a major accounting change in the NIPA.
The capitalization of IPP has been gradually introduced by the Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis (BEA) through two comprehensive revisions of the NIPA. In 1999, the 11th BEA revision
capitalized software expenditures by business, NPISH, and government. Prior to this revision,
software expenditure was considered intermediate nondurable consumption in the business sector
and final consumption in NPISH and general government. Analogously, after the 14th revision
in 2013, the BEA treats the expenditures by businesses, NPISH, and the government for R&D
and those by private enterprises for the creation of entertainment, literary and artistic originals
(henceforth, artistic originals) as investment in the form of durable capital, that is, no longer
as business expenditures in intermediate nondurable goods or as NPISH and government final
consumption. These newly recognized forms of investment (i.e., software, R&D, and artistic
originals) constitute the set of intangible assets currently measured by the BEA, the so-called
IPP. These revisions aim to capture the increasingly important role of IPP in the US economy
(Corrado et al., 2005, McGrattan and Prescott, 2010, 2014, Akcigit et al., 2016). Notably, the
share of IPP in aggregate investment secularly increases from 3.1% in 1901 to 27.0% in 2018; see
panel (a) of Figure 1. Similarly, the share of IPP in GDP increases from 0.7% in 1929 to 5.5%
in 2018; see panel (b) of Figure 1. This structural shift toward a more IPP-intensive economy
measured by the BEA is large and does not show signs of deceleration.1
What are the effects of the capitalization of IPP on the LS? These effects strictly depend on
how the newly recognized income (or rents) generated from IPP is distributed between capital
and labor. We find that the capitalization of IPP unambiguously lowers the level of the LS in a
purely accounting sense. The reason is simple. The BEA attributes the entire rents generated
from IPP to capital income. First, in terms of the business sector, the capitalization of IPP
revises up the value added (V A) of businesses by an amount equal to the gross investment in
business IPP—which is equal to the sum of own-account IPP and purchased IPP in the business
1Excluding residential investment accentuates this shift: IPP investment increases from 4.3% of nonresidential
aggregate investment in 1901 to 33.2% in 2018. In the corporate sector, the shares increase from 4.9% of total
corporate investment in 1929 to 35.8% in 2018.
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sector.2 To restore the accounting identity between the product side and the income side of the
national accounts, the BEA must attribute the increase in the product to the factors’ income.
The current accounting assumption is to attribute the entire gross investment in business IPP to
gross operating surplus (GOS), i.e., to capital income. This attribution automatically lowers the
LS, which is one minus the ratio of the GOS to the V A. That is, an increase in IPP investment
on the product side of the accounts translates into an equal increase of capital income on the
income side of the accounts and, hence, on a lower LS constructed from national accounts.
Second, since the NPISH and government expenditure in the IPP was previously treated as part
of the final consumption and hence already in the value added, the capitalization increases the
NPISH and government product by an amount equal to the depreciation of their respective IPP
capital. From the income side of the accounts, the NPISH and government IPP depreciation is
allocated to GOS, which further lowers the level of the LS.
In this context, the fact that IPP investment is increasing over time at a faster rate than
output implies that the capitalization of IPP can affect not only the level of the LS but also the
trend of the LS. Our question is: Could the rise in IPP investment over time explain the secular
decline of the LS? We find that it entirely does. To measure the effects of the capitalization
of IPP on the secular behavior of the LS, we compare our benchmark LS, which is constructed
using current post-2013 BEA revision data, with a counterfactual accounting LS in which we
decapitalize IPP from national accounts. The counterfactual accounting LS is constructed by
undoing the capitalization of IPP, that is, removing gross business investment in IPP and NPISH
and government IPP depreciation from both GOS and V A. This counterfactual accounting LS
is consistent with the accounting rule in which all IPP is considered as an expense, as was the
procedure before the revisions that capitalized IPP. The comparison between the benchmark LS
and this counterfactual accounting LS yields the main result of our paper: In sharp contrast to
the benchmark LS which exhibits a prolonged secular decline, the counterfactual LS in which
IPP is expensed instead of capitalized is absolutely trendless. That is, the capitalization of IPP
explains the entire secular decline of the LS.3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the BEA revisions that capitalize
IPP in Section 2. We show the effects of the IPP capitalization on the decline of the LS in
Section 3. In that section, we also examine the decline of the LS by institutional sector including
2We describe the details of capitalizing own-account IPP and purchased IPP respectively in Section 2.
3The BEA is always trying to improve the measurement of national accounts and frequently updating the
accounts. For example, as part of these ongoing revisions, the BEA is aiming to reclassify software R&D from
software investment to R&D investment and incorporating capital services into the estimates of own-account
investment in software and R&D. Part of these changes were introduced in the 2018 comprehensive revision of
NIPA. All our data was retrieved from the BEA on Sep. 25, 2019 and we find that our results are not altered by
this most recent revision.
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the corporate sector and by using broader measures of intangible capital beyond those captured
by the BEA. We provide international evidence in Section 4. We examine the BEA’s assumptions
on the factor distribution of IPP rents and provide further discussion in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Capitalization of IPP in the National Accounts
Under the current system of national accounts used by the BEA, the expenditure on IPP (i.e.,
software, R&D, and artistic originals) is treated as part of aggregate investment in NIPA. This
treatment is the result of two recent comprehensive BEA revisions that gradually and retrospec-
tively capitalized IPP items—software in the 1999 revision and R&D and artistic originals in the
2013 revision. Prior to these revisions, IPP was treated as expenditure in intermediate nondurable
goods for businesses and as final consumption for NPISH and the government. Because the ac-
counting changes associated with the capitalization of software, R&D and artistic originals are
analogous, we place the two recent revisions into one illustrative IPP revision. We describe the
impact of the capitalization of IPP on the business accounts in Section 2.1, on the entire economy
including NPISH and government accounts in Section 2.2, and on the LS in Section 2.3.
2.1 Effects of IPP Capitalization on the Business Accounts
Denote the pre-revision gross output in the business sector with Q (line 1, Table 1). Businesses
engage in both in-house production of IPP and purchases of IPP. The capitalization of IPP implies
that the business expenditure in own-account IPP, Io, becomes part of gross output.
4 That is,
the revised gross output increases by an amount equal to the expenditure on own-account IPP
and becomes Q+ Io (line 3, Table 1).
In terms of intermediate expenditure, the pre-revision accounting has two components: The
expenditure on intermediate inputs in the production of non-IPP and own-account IPP (e.g., cost
of energy for in-house R&D labs), M , plus the business expenditure on purchased IPP, Ip (line
4, Table 1). The capitalization of IPP implies that business expenditure on purchased IPP is no
longer considered an intermediate expenditure in the post-revision accounting (line 6, Table 1).
Subtracting the intermediate expenditure from the gross output, we obtain the value added.
4Software and R&D purchases are captured with receipts from sales data from the Census Bureau. However,
a large part of IPP is produced in-house and not sold in the market. Because own-account software and R&D are
not sold in the market, the BEA estimates the own-account production of software and R&D as the sum of costs
(i.e., wages, nonwages, and intermediates) plus a markup based on the net operating surplus of the miscellaneous
professional, scientific, and technical services industry (Crawford et al., 2014). Investment in artistic originals is
measured using net present valuation.
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The value added is consequently revised up by an amount equal to the gross investment in IPP in
the business sector, that is, the sum of business expenditure in own-account IPP and purchased
IPP, or Ib = Io +Ip (lines 7 to 9, Table 1). This revision increases the value added in the business
sector by $2.0 billion (or 0.93%) in 1947 and by $931.1 billion (or 5.44%) in 2018.
On the income side of the business accounts, the BEA increases income by the same amount
as the gross IPP investment in the business sector. This preserves the balance of the product and
income accounts in the business sector. The BEA must also decide to which income accounts to
attribute the rents from IPP investment. Let’s denote with χ ∈ [0, 1] the proportion of IPP rents
attributed to capital income accounts, and 1−χ the proportion attributed to labor income. The
choice of χ will turn out to be a critical decision for the secular behavior of the LS. We denote the
compensation of employees by W and obtain the GOS as the value added minus W . The current
accounting assumption implemented by the BEA regarding the split of IPP between capital and
labor is to allocate the entire IPP investment rents to GOS. That is, the BEA assumes that the
income rents from IPP investment are entirely attributed to capital income accounts, i.e., χ =
1. This implies that GOS is revised up by exactly the gross investment in IPP in the business
sector, Io + Ip (lines 11 to 13, Table 1). Precisely, GOS is revised up by 1.93% in 1947 and by
11.4% in 2018.
Lastly, we divide the GOS into its two components: the depreciation and the net operating
surplus (NOS). The capitalization of IPP naturally generates depreciation for the IPP capital,
DIb , which must be added to the pre-revision depreciation (lines 14 to 16, Table 1). Consequently,
the NOS is increased by the net investment in business IPP, that is, Ib − DIb (lines 17 to 20,
Table 1). Further breakdown along the finer categories of the business income account shows
that the boost in NOS increases corporate profits and proprietors’ income (McCulla et al., 2013).
Due to the increase in depreciation, the revision increases NOS less than it increases GOS. More
specifically, NOS is revised up by 0.69% in 1947 and by 2.19% in 2018.
2.2 Effects of IPP Capitalization on Private and Government Accounts
We now discuss the NPISH and government sector which includes all federal, state, and local
governments. Businesses and NPISH together form the private sector, and with the government
sector, they complete the discussion of the effects of IPP capitalization on the national accounts.
The capitalization of IPP affects the NPISH accounts and the government accounts in a
similar manner. The IPP expenditure by the NPISH, Inp, (or the government, Ig) was treated
as personal consumption expenditure (or government final consumption) before the revision as
opposed to investment expenditure after the revision. For this reason, the pre-revision accounting
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did not include the depreciation of NPISH IPP capital, DInp , (or the depreciation of government
IPP capital, DIg), in the product accounts and this changes with the capitalization of IPP. The
revision moves NPISH (or government) net investment in IPP out of personal (or government)
consumption (lines 1 to 3 and 7 to 9 in Table 2). Upon revision, private (or government) gross
investment increases by the gross investment in business and NPISH (or government) IPP (lines
4 to 6 and 10 to 12 in Table 2).
The total effects on the private sector, which is the sum of the businesses and NPISH, are that
personal consumption is revised down by the net investment in IPP by the NPISH, Inp−DInp , and
the gross private investment is revised up by the sum of the business and NPISH gross investment
in IPP, Ib+Inp. These results imply that private product is revised up by gross business investment
in IPP, Ib, plus the depreciation of NPISH IPP capital, DInp . The total effect on the government
expenditure, which is the sum of the government consumption and gross government investment,
is that it is revised up by the depreciation of the government IPP capital, DIg (lines 13 to 15,
Table 2).5
Piecing together the private and the government sectors, the revised gross domestic product,
GDP , inherits all these effects from private consumption, private gross investment, and govern-
ment expenditure. Therefore, the revised GDP is increased by an amount equal to the increase
in the business investment in IPP, Ib, plus the depreciation of NPISH IPP capital, DInp , and the
depreciation of government IPP capital, DIg (lines 16 to 20, Table 2). In summary, this revision
results in an increase of $1,127 billion in the GDP in 2018, that is, an increase of 5.79% with
respect to its pre-revision counterpart. The effect is much lower in 1929, with an increase of $0.6
billion, that is, an increase of 0.58% of its pre-revision counterpart.
On the income side of the accounts, the capitalization of IPP increases gross domestic income
(GDI) by the same amount as GDP , that is, by the sum of the gross investment in business
IPP and the depreciation of NPISH and government IPP capital, Ib + DIg + DInp . As was the
case for the business sector, for the entire economy, the BEA also assumes that all the increase
in GDI that results from the capitalization of IPP is attributed to GOS and, hence, to capital
income. In other words, GOS and GDI are increased by exactly the same amount. Notably, we
can decompose the increase in GOS as the net investment in business IPP (i.e., Ib −DIb) plus
5McCulla et al. (2013) document that there were two additional changes introduced in reclassifying government
IPP from consumption to investment. First, there was a change in the ownership of IPP assets from state and
local governments to federal government. Second, BEA started using National Science Foundation (NSF) surveys
of R&D instead of federal budget data. Those two changes make government R&D investment slightly larger than
government R&D consumption. We do not incorporate these additional accounting changes in the pre-revision
accounting counterfactuals that we describe in Section 3. However, note that removing this additional government
R&D investment to construct the pre-revision accounting LS would simply strengthen our results in Section 3.
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the total depreciation of IPP summing over all sectors (i.e., DIb +DIg +DInp). Consequently, the
net operating surplus (NOS) is increased by the net investment in business IPP, which increases
corporate profits and proprietors’ income.
2.3 Qualitative Implications for the LS
It should be clear by now that the addition of the amount of IPP investment to the product account
is balanced by an equal addition to GOS in the income account. This particular accounting
procedure chosen by the BEA allows us to undo the capitalization of IPP in a straightforward
way and assess its implications for the LS. Clearly, if IPP investment is strictly positive, then the
capitalization of IPP unambiguously decreases the LS. To observe this decrease, define the LS as
LS = 1− GOS
Y
,
where Y is GDP and the ratio of GOS to Y is the capital share of income.6 Then, the difference
between the post-revision LS, LSPost, and the pre-revision LS, LSPre, is:














where ∆ = Ib +DIg +DInp = GOSPost −GOSPre = YPost − YPre > 0. The negative sign in the
last inequality is explained by Y being larger than its components: Y > GOS, and Y > ∆.
Thus, under the accounting assumption on the factor income distribution of IPP rents—that
attributes all these rents to GOS, the effects of the capitalization of IPP on the secular behavior
of the LS depend solely on the rise of IPP investment, in particular,





This opens the question of whether the capitalization of IPP can explain the decline of the LS.
This is the quantitative question that we explore next.
3 The Effects of IPP Capitalization on the LS
We construct our benchmark LS using an economy-wide definition standard in the macroeco-
nomics literature (Cooley and Prescott, 1995). We split the components of national income
6Here we use GOS interchangeably with capital income, although part of GOS cannot be unambiguously
attributed to capital (e.g., proprietor’s income). While this is innocuous for the qualitative argument of this
section, we carefully correct for this ambiguous income in our quantitative analysis in Section 3.
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that cannot be unambiguously attributed to capital or labor by using the factor shares of the
unambiguous income of the economy. This is equivalent to the following definition of the LS:




where Y is GDP and we adjust gross operating surplus, GOS, for the ambiguous income in the
economy, that is, proprietor’s income, PI, and taxes (less subsidies) on production and imports,
TS. Our adjusted gross operating surplus is GOSadj = (GOS − θ(PI + TS)) where we set θ
to be the labor share of the unambiguous income of the economy.7,8
Figure 2 shows the time series of the benchmark LS (i.e., the economy-wide BEA LS labeled
as “BEA LS”). Clearly, the LS exhibits a relentless secular decline. Linearly, the LS declines at
an annual rate of -0.072% between 1929 and 2018. A historic high is achieved in 1946 at 69.4%,
and a historic low is achieved in 2010 at 61.5%. On average, the benchmark LS is 65.2%.
To assess the effects of IPP capitalization on the LS, we compare our benchmark LS with a
counterfactual accounting LS consistent with the accounting treatment of IPP before the 1999
BEA revision. Specifically, we subtract the gross investment in business IPP (Ib), the NPISH
IPP capital depreciation (DInp), and the government IPP capital depreciation (DIg) from GOS
and Y as described in Section 2. The counterfactual accounting LS that follows the pre-1999
accounting rule is as follows:
LSPre-1999 = 1−
GOSadj − (Ib +DInp +DIg)
Y − (Ib +DInp +DIg)
. (2)
The comparison between our benchmark LS (blue line, Figure 2) and the pre-1999 revision
counterfactual LS (orange line, Figure 2) delivers the main result of our paper: In sharp contrast to
the decline of the benchmark LS, the pre-1999 revision counterfactual LS is absolutely trendless,
with an average value of 67.5%. That is, the decline of the LS is entirely explained by the
capitalization of IPP in national accounts. Had the BEA kept the pre-1999 treatment of IPP as
an expense, the LS would have displayed no secular trend.9
7That is, θ = 1− GOSY−PI−TS . Note that this also implies that LS = 1−
GOS
Y−PI−TS
8In the Online Appendix, we also add capital income from consumer durables and government capital to both
GOSadj and Y , by using the net rate of return of the private business and the respective depreciation rates for
consumer durables and government capital from the Fixed Assets Tables (FAT), see Cooley and Prescott (1995).
This is consistent with the definitions of the LS in the business cycle literature (Gomme and Greenwood, 1995,
Boldrin and Horvath, 1995, Gomme and Rupert, 2004, 2007, Ŕıos-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis, 2010, McGrattan
and Prescott, 2014, Koh and Santaeulàlia-Llopis, 2017). The results of our exercise remain to hold.
9Our results are also externally validated using vintage data; see our Online Appendix.
7
The rising role of software after the 1970s. Our analysis has focused on the counterfactual
accounting LS consistent with pre-1999 treatment of IPP, that is, before the capitalization of both
software and R&D.10 To understand the role played by software and R&D respectively, we provide
a second counterfactual accounting LS consistent with the accounting rule right before the 2013
BEA revision. That is, we decapitalize only R&D from the national accounts. Specifically, we
subtract the gross investment in business R&D (Ib,R&D), the NPISH R&D capital depreciation
(DInp,R&D), and the government R&D capital depreciation (DIg,R&D) from both GOS and Y .
This counterfactual LS consistent with the pre-2013 accounting rule is as follows:
LSPre-2013 = 1−
GOSadj − (Ib,R&D +DInp,R&D +DIg,R&D)
Y − (Ib,R&D +DInp,R&D +DIg,R&D)
. (3)
Compared with the benchmark LS, the pre-2013 revision counterfactual LS displays a milder
decline that starts in the mid-1970s and is approximately half of that of the benchmark LS over
the sample period (panel (a), Figure 3). This suggests a quantitatively similar role for software
and R&D in explaining the decline of the LS.
A simple decomposition quantifies the effects of R&D and software capitalization separately.
First, we measure the effects of R&D capitalization on the LS decline as the difference between
the BEA LS [equation (1)] and the pre-2013 revision counterfactual LS [equation (3)]. Second,
the effects of software capitalization on the LS decline can be computed as the difference between
the pre-2013 revision counterfactual LS [equation (3)] and the pre-1999 revision counterfactual
LS [equation (2)]. The total decline of the LS is the sum of these two effects. Our results are in
panel (b) of Figure 3. Clearly, it is the capitalization of software what solely drives the declining
trend of the LS after 1980s, while the capitalization of R&D generates the decline of the LS before
the 1980s. This simply reflects the growing relative importance of software in IPP investment.
Another way to explore this issue is by decomposing the increase of the capital share into that
of its components. In panel (a) of Figure 4, we plot the capital share, i.e., 1− LS, and that of
its components, the IPP capital share ( I
Y




green line). Clearly, the sole driver of the rise of the capital share are the income rents from IPP.
In contrast, the tangible capital share declines over time. In panel (b) of Figure 4, we find that
the rise of the IPP capital share is driven largely by R&D before the 1980s and by software after
the 1980s. Artistic originals play a minor role in the level and trend of the IPP capital share.
This result speaks to earlier work on the decline of the LS that relies solely on the pre-2013
revision data (Elsby et al., 2013, Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). We show that the decline
10For ease of reference, we subsume artistic originals to the R&D; thus, in the notation that follows, R&D and
artistic originals are simply referred to as R&D.
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of the LS observed in that earlier work—that uses data for which software is capitalized but not
R&D—is fully explained by the capitalization of software. To see this, we can simply compare the
declining pre-2013 revision LS in which software is capitalized (pink line, panel (a) of Figure 3)
with the trendless pre-1999 revision LS in which software is not capitalized (orange line, panel
(a) of Figure 3).
Institutional Sectors. We now conduct our analysis by institutional sectors. We first examine
three broad institutional sectors that exhaustively capture the economy: (1) the domestic business
sector, (2) the household sector (including NPISH) and (3) the general government.11 We show
IPP investment for these institutional sectors as a share of aggregate gross value added (GVA)
in panel (a1) of Figure 5. From 1948, the first year in our sample, to early 1970s, the domestic
business and government sectors make roughly equal contribution to IPP investment. However,
since the mid-1960s the government’s contribution to IPP is steadily decreasing as a share of
GVA, whereas the IPP share of domestic businesses keeps rising throughout the entire period.
Over the sample period, the growth of IPP share is mainly driven by the domestic business sector.
In 2018, the share of IPP in GVA contributed by domestic businesses is 4.3% while that by the
general government sector is only 0.9%. The contribution of households (including NPISH) to
IPP growth is a positive, albeit minor, 0.3% of GVA.12 Second, as is the case with the economy-
wide LS, the capitalization of IPP explains the entire decline of the LS in domestic businesses;
see panel (a2) of Figure 5. The pre-1999 revision LS in domestic businesses is trendless with
a long-run average of 68.7%. In contrast, the LS in the household sector and the LS in the
government sector are increasing in both post-2013 and pre-1999 revision data; see panels (a3)
and (a4) of Figure 5. The level of the LS for these sectors also differs from that of domestic
businesses, with the household sector averaging a lower LS of 39.4% and the government sector
averaging a higher LS of 85.6%. This broad institutional analysis shows that the business sector
drives the effects of IPP capitalization on the economy-wide LS.
We further decompose the domestic business sector into (1) the corporate sector (including
nonfinancial and financial corporations) and (2) the noncorporate sector that includes sole propri-
etorships, partnerships and government enterprises. The first observation is that most of the IPP
investment in domestic businesses is captured by the corporate sector. For example, in 2018, IPP
investment by the corporate sector accounts for 3.9% of aggregate GVA , while IPP investment
in the noncorporate business sector accounts for a much smaller 0.4% of GVA. The behaviors
of the corporate and noncorporate LS are depicted respectively in panel (b1) and (b2) of Fig-
11This analysis is limited to the period 1948-2018, for which the data by institutional sector are available. Only
income components of the corporate sector (and of the aggregate economy) are available from 1929 to 2018.
12In our Online Appendix, we further study differences between the household sector and the NPISH sector.
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ure 5.13 Although the long-run trend of the corporate LS with current data displays an annual
decline of -0.093%, the pre-1999 revision counterfactual corporate LS consistent with expensing
IPP is trendless. That is, the main result we obtain from the economy-wide analysis extends to
the corporate sector. A further decomposition between nonfinancial and financial corporations
(respective panels (b3) and (b4)) shows that the results of the corporate sector are largely driven
by nonfinancial corporations. The effects of IPP capitalization on the noncorporate LS are minor
(panel (b2)). To sum up, domestic businesses, in particular, the nonfinancial corporations, are
responsible for the effects of IPP capitalization on the secular behavior of the economy-wide LS.
Broader measures of intangible capital. IPP, as measured by the BEA, captures some types
of intangible capital in the economy, but not all (Corrado et al., 2009, McGrattan and Prescott,
2010). We now assess the effects of capitalizing a broader set of intangible investments on the
long-run behavior of the LS. In particular, we use the series constructed by Corrado et al. (2009)
and their updates for intangible items not included in national accounts, InonNA. These series of
intangible investment consist of (1) Finance and insurance new product development, (2) Design,
(3) Brand, (4) Training, and (5) Organizational capital.
In panel (a) of Figure 6, we compare the properties of intangible investment incorporated in
national accounts (i.e., IPP) with intangible investment not incorporated in national accounts
(i.e., InonNA).
14,15 We find that InonNA is larger than IPP. The ratio of private IPP to private
InonNA increases from 38.6% in 1977 to 61.4% in 2014. That is, IPP in the BEA grows faster than
the intangible investment not incorporated in national accounts. However, once we incorporate
government IPP investment, the differences between IPP and InonNA decrease. We find that the
ratio of the two is large, on average approximately 74.7% for the entire sample period, and it
increases from 68.6% in 1977 to 77.2% in 2014. This implies that if national accounts were to
incorporate the total intangible investment (i.e., IPP plus InonNA), then the current measure of
13Previous work on the LS has focused on the corporate sector. An advantage of focusing on the corporate
sector is that the corporate sector does not have ambiguous income (i.e. proprietor’s income), for which the
attribution to factor income is less straightforward. In addition, the corporate sector does not include either
households or governments, for which the measurement of the LS is subject to criticism (Gomme and Rupert,
2004, 2007).
14Since the BEA provides a longer time series of IPP (i.e., software, R&D and artistic originals) than Corrado
et al. (2009) and their updates, we use the BEA series for these forms of intangible capital. We find minor
differences between these two sources: Software in the BEA tends to be smaller and R&D tends to be larger
than their counterparts in Corrado et al. (2009). This is due to the fact that, after BEA’s 2018 revision, R&D in
software, which was part of the software account in previous versions of the BEA data, is now part of the R&D
account.
15The BEA incorporates mineral exploration in structures since, at least, the 1999 BEA revision, whereas other
countries include this type of investment in intangible capital in national accounts. The BEA did not reclassify
the mineral exploration to IPP at the 2013 comprehensive revision because they did not have enough information
to disentangle exploration drilling (conceptually an investment in R&D) from production drilling (conceptually an
investment in structures).
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intangible investment of the BEA would increase by a factor of 2.34.16
The implications of these broader measures of intangible investment for the long-run behavior
of the LS are reported in panel (b) Figure 6. The broader measure of intangible investment
enlarges the long-run decline of the LS. Specifically, if the national accounts were to capitalize
the broader set of intangibles, then the LS would significantly decline at an annual rate of -0.15%,
which is a rate twice as large as the decline of the LS with the current IPP in NIPA. Finally, note
that this analysis does not alter the pre-1999 revision counterfactual LS that remains trendless.
4 International Evidence
The 2013 BEA comprehensive revision that capitalizes R&D and artistic originals in the U.S.
is based on the capitalization guidelines provided by the System of National Accounts 2008
(SNA08).17 The SNAs are quinquennially updated and provide the international accounting
standards and principles that are implemented by national statistics offices.18 Indeed, most
OECD countries already follow the SNA08’s guide on IPP capitalization. We now extend our
main analysis to several countries that currently capitalize IPP. Because we are interested in the
long-run behavior of the LS, we focus on a selection of countries for which long time series dating
back at least to the 1960s are available: Canada, France, Denmark, Sweden and Japan.19
The results for these countries are similar to those for the U.S., see Figure 7. First, the LS
(blue line) declines significantly in all five countries. For the country with the longest period of
available data, Canada, the LS shows a long-run (linear) trend that annually decreases by -0.023%
from 1926 to 2018 (see panel (a) in Figure 7). The LS linearly declines by an annual -0.130%
in Denmark between 1966 and 2018 (panel (b)), by an annual -0.116% in France between 1950
and 2018 (panel (c)), by an annual -0.13731% in Japan between 1955 and 2017 (panel (d)) and
by an annual -0.217% in Sweden between 1950 and 2018 (panel (e)). The decline is significant
at 1% level in all countries except Canada, in which the significance is at 10% level. Second, the
share of IPP investment in GDP rises in each of the five countries (see panel (f)) of Figure 7.
The IPP investment share in GDP increases from a level below 1% at the beginning of the
sample period to a level that is approximately 5.5% of GDP in the late 2010s in all countries
except Canada, where it grows to approximately 3% of GDP in the 2010s. Third, we assess the
16Precisely, incorporating InonNA to national accounts implies that intangible investment goes up by a factor
of (1+1/0.747)=2.34. In other words, the BEA currently captures 42.7% of the total intangible investment
measured by Corrado et al. (2009).
17In the same fashion, the System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA93) provided the guidelines for the capital-
ization of software that the BEA adopted in the 1999 comprehensive revision of national accounts.
18The System of National Accounts: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna.asp.
19Details about the construction of the LS for these countries can be found in our Online Appendix.
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effects of IPP capitalization by constructing a counterfactual accounting LS consistent with the
pre-SNA93 accounting rule in which IPP is expensed. The effects of the IPP capitalization on
the long-run behavior of the LS are similar across countries. In all countries, the counterfactual
accounting LS is trendless. Specifically, the long-run trend of the pre-SNA93 counterfactual LS is
an annual slope of 0.019% in Canada, -0.012% in Denmark, -0.023% in France, -0.036% in Japan
and -0.095% in Sweden, none of which is significantly different from zero. The only exception
is Sweden, in which IPP accounts for more than 56% of the LS decline but leaves a significant
44% of the decline unexplained.
5 Discussion
The finding that the capitalization of IPP explains the decline of the LS raises some questions over
the accounting procedure that capitalizes the IPP. In particular, we question a critical accounting
assumption on the factor distribution of rents generated from IPP. Let 1 − χ ∈ [0, 1] denote
the fraction of IPP rents attributed to labor and χ the fraction attributed to capital. The BEA
assumes that all rents from IPP go to capital, which effectively sets χ to one (see Section 2).
How can we interpret 1−χ? Our preferred interpretation of 1−χ is the portion of IPP rents
paid to workers in the form of equity. For example, corporate R&D workers and lab managers
obtain a large part of their labor compensation in incentive stock options (ISOs), restricted
stock units, and other forms of stock-based compensation (Lerner and Wulf, 2007), which are
currently absent in the compensation of employees in BEA’s income account.20 More generally,
this interpretation is akin to the notion of sweat equity in McGrattan and Prescott (2010, 2014).
It describes a scenario in which workers are paid wages lower than their marginal value product
in return for some equity.21 Along this line of argument, a growing literature in corporate finance
documents that an essential property of intangible capital is that it is partly embodied in key
talents such as managers, engineers, and research employees of the firm, and is hence portable
(Lustig et al., 2011, Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2014, Sun and Xiaolan, 2019). The property
20BEA aims at including in the compensation of employees an employee’s gain from exercising nonqualified
stock options (NSOs) at the time they are exercised, but does not include ISOs at all. This choice follows the
accounting principle of not including capital gains in NIPA, because they do not produce goods or services. Since
the NSOs are treated as additional taxable income by the tax authorities at the time they are exercised, the BEA
attempts to include the NSOs in compensation. However, its attempt faces serious challenges because not all US
states mandate the collection of this information and even if they do, the accuracy is questionable (Moylan, 2008).
It is for this reason that NIPA does not provide a separate time series for NSOs. In contrast to the NSOs, the
ISOs are taxed as long-term capital gains when sold and are completely absent in NIPA; see Table 1 of Chapter
10 “Compensation of Employees” in the NIPA Handbook: Concepts and Methods of the US National Income and
Product Accounts, November, 2017.
21This is also the case for unincorporated businesses, whose owners invest time in accumulating intangible
capital for their businesses, such as building the client list or brand equity (Bhandari and McGrattan, 2018).
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right over such capital is different from physical capital: the key talents own, at least partially,
the cash flow from intangible capital in the form of equity.22
What are the values of χ for which the secular LS is trendless? To answer this question, we
write the LS explicitly as a function of χ,
LS = 1− GOS
adj − (1− χ)I
Y
. (4)
Under the current BEA accounting assumption that sets χ equal to one, the LS declines; see
panel (a) of Figure 8. In the opposite extreme, where all IPP rents are attributed to labor income
(i.e., χ = 0), the LS displays a significant upward trend. An intermediate value of χ = 0.5 delivers
a trendless LS. Clearly, the value of χ has direct implications on the secular behavior of the LS.
Moreover, χ is not necessarily constant.23 We now examine the effects on the LS of various
hypothetical linear time-series of χ using the following specification: ln(1−χ) = ln(1−χ0)+γt.
Panel (b) of Figure 8 shows the combinations of initial values (horizontal axis) and growth rates
(vertical axis) that imply either a secularly increasing LS (upper right region) or a secularly
decreasing LS (lower left region). Sandwiched between the two regions is the region of χ that
implies a secularly trendless LS (solid black line) with the associated 95% confidence interval.
First, if 1 − χ is constant (i.e., γ equals zero), then the range of values for which the LS is
trendless is (1−χ) ∈ [0.52, 0.91]. That is, the LS significantly declines for values of 1−χ below
0.52 and significantly increases for values of 1 − χ above 0.91. Second, the area in which the
LS secularly declines is smaller the larger is the growth of 1− χ. For example, if we assume that
1− χ grows by twenty per cent over the course of a century (i.e., an annual growth of 0.18%),
then the range of values for which the LS is trendless is (1− χ) ∈ [0.34, 0.73].
What are plausible values for χ? If some rents generated from IPP, which should be attributed
to labor, are not captured by the BEA’s compensation of employees (e.g., equity compensation
for software developers), then empirically plausible values for χ must be less than one. Though
inconclusive, the current estimates for χ suggests that this is the case. McGrattan and Prescott
(2010) use a latent variable approach to recover intangible assets (including but not limited to
IPP) in a U.S. model economy and calibrate a benchmark value of χ equal to 0.5. Using a
22The divergence of the labor compensation in measurements and in theory is also the subject of study in
Hartman-Glaser et al. (2018), Bhandari and McGrattan (2018), Eisfeldt et al. (2019), and Smith et al. (2019).
However, not all the literature studying equity compensation focuses on IPP-related employees, which is our
concern here.
23Moylan (2008) documents that, for an average executive, the share of equity-based compensation of total
compensation increases from 1994 to 2005. Eisfeldt et al. (2019) provides estimates of the aggregate equity-based
compensation as a share of total value added for the US from 1960 to 2005, which increases rapidly in the last
three decades (Figure 4 in their paper).
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nonrepresentative sample of the corporate sector, Lerner and Wulf (2007) show that the ratio
of the value of long-term incentives to cash compensation for corporate R&D heads more than
doubled over the course of the 1990s, which implies that 1 − χ increases from 0.25 in 1988 to
0.57 in 1998.24 In panel (c) of Figure 8, we plot the aforementioned estimates of 1− χ against
their associated sample periods. We also entertain two alternative ready-to-use series of χ. First,
because the BEA equates the income generated from IPP investment to the expenditure on IPP,
it seems natural to base the assumption about the factor distribution of IPP rents on the cost
structure of IPP. Specifically, we construct 1 − χ using the cost structure of R&D from the
nationally representative Business Research and Development and Innovation Survey (BRDIS)
of for-profit nonfarm businesses with five or more employees operating in the U.S. with known
R&D activity.25 For our calculation of χ, we use information about domestic R&D paid for by
type of costs for all years available.26 Precisely, we use information about R&D costs in terms of
wages, salaries, fringe benefits, and intermediate expenditures. This implies a measure of 1− χ
equal to (Wages + Salaries + Fringe Benefits)/(Total R&D Cost - Intermediate Expenses). We
subtract R&D costs paid for materials and supplies as intermediate expenses from the total costs,
because the classification of the cost as either capital or labor is ambiguous.27 Second, we treat
IPP rents as ambiguous income in the same manner as we treat proprietor’s income and taxes
(less subsidies) in the construction of the LS. This implies χ = 1− GOS−I
Y−I in equation (4). This
measurement of χ has the advantage that it is available for our entire sample period and is also
invariant to the introduction of more types of intangible capital in national accounts.28 Panels
(a) and (b) of Figure 8 show that all these alternative estimates of χ deliver a secular LS that is
trendless.
Related issues on the measurement of investment. Our findings are directly related to the
measurement of investment. The incorporation of IPP investment into GDP raises questions
about how national accounts distinguish between intermediate expenditure and investment. The
SNA proposes that expenditure that provides economic return for more than a year be considered
as investment (see United Nations (2009) pp.121-123); an accounting principle which, although
24Lerner and Wulf (2007) find that the long-term incentives to cash compensation ratio increases from 0.39 in
1988 to 0.87 in 1998. We define 1− χ as the ratio of long-term incentives to cash compensation times the LS.
25See BRDIS (https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvyindustry/) for the years of 1991-2016 and the Sur-
vey of Industrial Research and Development (SIRD: https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvyindustry/sird.
cfm)—the predecessor to BRDIS—for the years of 1962-1991. NSF sends out a standard survey to companies
with known R&D activities and a short survey screener to other companies. The sample size is 42,122.
26The distribution of R&D costs was collected biennially for years between 1977 and 1997 in BRDIS and SIRD.
27A measure of stock-based compensation is available in the NSF survey, but only after 2008. In addition, the
NSF questionnaire does not specify what types of stock-based compensation are included, so it is solely up to the
respondents to decide what to report. We decided not to include these reported payments in our analysis.
28Further, it is straightforward to see that the χ implied by treating IPP rents as ambiguous income delivers a
LS that is equivalent to one in which IPP investment is expensed.
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followed by national statistical offices, is nevertheless arbitrary. Further, there is the added
difficulty of measuring and determining the duration of economic returns that exceed the one-
year threshold, in particular, for items with relatively high depreciation rates (e.g., software).
An alternative to the challenging measurement of χ and that of investment is to focus on a
LS defined as the ratio of compensation of labor to total payouts to labor and owners of firms,
where the measure of total payouts to labor and owners of firms is the sum of compensation of
employees (CE) and gross operating surplus (GOS) less investment in equipment, structures,
and intellectual property products.29 In effect, this is the LS in Barro (2019) where aggregate
investment is expensed,
LS = 1− GOS −X − I





where DIV = GOS −X − I and X is tangible investment. Notice that it makes no difference
to the payout to owners of firms if expenditures on intangible investment are recorded as final
investment expenditures or as expenditures on intermediate goods. If aggregate investment is
fully expensed, then the economy-wide counterfactual accounting LS is trendless; see panel (a)
of Figure 9. Nevertheless, expensing tangible investment alone cannot generate this result. To
see this, we isolate the effects of expensing tangible investment (green line) and expensing both
tangible and IPP investment (magenta line) respectively. If we expense only tangible investment,
then the counterfactual accounting LS still declines. The LS flattens out only when we additionally
expense IPP investment. For the corporate sector, the LS is even increasing after expensing
aggregate investment; see panel (b) of Figure 9.
6 Conclusion
We show that the change in the accounting treatment of IPP gradually implemented by the BEA
since 1999 is the sole driver of the decline of the LS. Moreover, our analysis indicates that less
extreme accounting assumptions on the factor distribution of IPP rents yield a secularly trendless
LS. At the same time, the medium-run behavior of the LS (e.g., its rise in the 1960s, 1990s
and 2010s) and other higher-frequency fluctuations as described in Ŕıos-Rull and Santaeulàlia-
Llopis (2010) do not seem to be accounted for by the capitalization of IPP and still beg for an
explanation.
29We thank Andy Atkeson for sharing this insight with us.
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Figure 1: Investment Shares, BEA 1929–2018
(a) Shares of Aggregate Investment (b) Shares of Gross Domestic Product
Notes: All data were retrieved from the BEA on Sep. 25, 2019. We use the longest time series available. Note
that investment series and its components start in 1901 from the Fixed Assets Accounts Tables (panel (a)), and
the gross domestic product series starts in 1929 from the National Income and Product Accounts Tables (panel
(b)). Our data and results are available in this permanent link: US Factor Shares.
Figure 2: Economy-Wide US Labor Share, BEA 1929–2018: Pre- Vs. Post-Revision Accounting
Notes: All data for the construction of LS were retrieved from the BEA on Sep. 25, 2019. The BEA LS (blue
line) is constructed based on the economy-wide definition described in Section 3 by using the current post-2013
revision BEA data from 1929 to 2018, the latest year available. The pre-1999 revision counterfactual accounting
LS uses equation (2) to replicate the accounting rule in which IPP is expensed. Dotted lines show linear trends
from 1929 to 2018. Our data and results are available in this permanent link: US Factor Shares.
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Figure 3: The Effects of Software and R&D Capitalization Revisions on the Labor Share
(a) Pre-2013 Revision LS (b) Decomposition of the LS Decline
Notes: All data were retrieved from the BEA on Sep. 25, 2019. In panel (a), the pre-2013 revision counterfactual
LS uses equation (3) to replicate the accounting rule in which software is capitalized and R&D (and artistic
originals) are expensed. The BEA LS [equation (1)] and the pre-1999 revision counterfactual LS [equation (2)]
are reproduced from Figure 2. Dotted lines show linear trends from 1929 to 2018. In panel (b), we compute the
total LS decline as the difference between the BEA LS and the pre-1999 revision counterfactual LS. The effects
of R&D capitalization on the LS decline is computed as the difference between the BEA LS and the pre-2013
revision counterfactual LS. The effects of software capitalization on the LS decline is computed as the difference
between the pre-2013 revision counterfactual LS and the pre-1999 revision counterfactual LS. The vertical gray
line in 1960 indicates the first year with nonzero software investment in NIPA. Our data and results are available
in this permanent link: US Factor Shares.
Figure 4: Tangible and IPP Capital Share of Income, BEA 1929–2018
(a) Capital Share and Its Components (b) IPP Capital Share and Its Components
Notes: The BEA capital share (blue line) is GOS
adj
Y , or one minus the BEA LS [equation (1)] plotted in Figure 2.
The IPP capital share of income (black line) is computed as the ratio of investment in IPP to GDP , that is, IY .
The tangible capital (i.e., equipment plus structures) share of income (green line) is GOS
adj−I
Y . Our data and all
the results of our analysis are available in this permanent link: US Factor Shares.
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Figure 5: Effects of IPP Capitalization by Institutional Sector
(a) Broad Institutional Sectors
(a1) IPP Share in GVA (%) (a2) Domestic Business LS
(a3) Household Sector (plus NPISH) LS (a4) General Government LS
(b) Within Domestic Businesses
(b1) Corporate LS (b2) Noncorporate LS
(b3) Nonfinancial Corporate LS (b4) Financial Corporate LS
Notes: All data were retrieved from the BEA on Sep. 25, 2019. We retrieve GVA by institutional sectors from
NIPA Table 1.3.5; CE and Tax-Sub by institutional sectors from NIPA Table 1.13; IPP investment by institutional
sectors from FAT 4.7 and 7.5. Our data and results are available in this permanent link: US Factor Shares.
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Figure 6: The Effects of Capitalizing Broader Measures of Intangible Capital
(a) Ratio of IPP to InonNA (b) Labor Share
Notes: Panel (a) shows the ratio of the investment on intangible capital currently incorporated in national
accounts (i.e., IPP) to the investment on intangible that is not incorporated in national accounts, using the
data from Corrado et al. (2009) and their updates. In panel (b), the current BEA LS that capitalizes IPP is
constructed as LS = 1− GOSGDP−TS−PI ; the pre-1999 revision counterfactual labor share that treats current IPP
as intermediate expenditure is LS = 1 − GOS−IPPGDP−TS−PI−IPP ; and the counterfactual LS that capitalizes broad
measures of intangible investment is LS = 1− GOS+InonNAGDP−TS−PI+InonNA .
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Figure 7: The Effects of IPP Capitalization on the Labor Share, International Evidence
(a) Canada 1926-2018 (b) Denmark 1966-2018
(c) France 1950-2018 (d) Japan 1955-2017
(e) Sweden 1950-2018 (f) IPP Shares of GDP
Notes: The data for each country was retrieved from the country’s statistical office for national accounts. Specif-
ically, the data for Canada was retrieved from Statistics Canada (https://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/start),
the data for Denmark from Statistics Denmark (https://www.dst.dk/en), the data for France from INSEE
(https://www.insee.fr/en/accueil), the data for Japan from the Cabinet Office (https://www.cao.go.
jp/index-e.html) and the data for Sweden from Statistics Sweden (https://www.stat.fi/index_en.html).
Details about the country-level data and the construction of LS with longer sample periods can be found in our
Online Appendix. Our data and results are available in this permanent link: US Factor Shares.
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Figure 8: US Labor Share under Alternative Assumptions on the Factor Distribution of IPP, χ
(a) Economy-wide LS Adjusted by χ
(b) Effects of the Level and Growth of χ on the LS
(c) Factor Distribution of IPP Rents: 1− χ
Notes: LS is constructed based on different capital-labor splits of IPP rents (χ) in equation (4). In the extreme,
IPP rents can be either fully assigned to capital income (χ = 1) or to labor income (χ = 0). As a less extreme case,
We use a model-based value for χ = 0.5 from McGrattan and Prescott (2010) (labeled as “MP”). Additionally,
we use two point estimates from Lerner and Wulf (2007) (labeled as “LW”) and take a linear trend over the 90
years as the growth rate of (1−χ). An alternative case is based on the cost structure of R&D from the nationally
representative Business Research and Development and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) conducted by NSF (labeled
as “NSF”). Another possible value for χ could be based on a value that treats IPP investment rents as ambiguous
income (labeled as “Amb. Rent”). Our data and results are available in this permanent link: US Factor Shares.
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Figure 9: Expensing Aggregate Investment, BEA 1929–2018
(a) Economy-wide LS (b) Corporate LS
Notes: Panel (a) shows a LS in which only tangible investment is expensed (green line) and another LS in which
aggregate investment (i.e., both tangible and IPP investment) is expensed (pink line). Panel (b) shows the same
LS series for the corporate sector. Our data and results are available in this permanent link: US Factor Shares.
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Table 1: Effects of IPP Capitalization on the Business Sector: Value Added and Income Accounts
USD Bill.
Notation 1947 2018
1. Gross output, pre-revision Q 430.5 31,943.5
2. Plus own-account IPP Io 1.5 687.6
3. Equals: Gross output, post-revision: Q+ Io 432.0 32,631.1
4. Intermediate expenditure, pre-revision M + Ip 216.4 14,839.0
5. Less purchased IPP Ip 0.5 243.5
6. Equals: Intermediate expenditure, post-revision M 215.9 14,595.5
7. Value added, pre-revision (L. 1−4): Q− (M + Ip) 214.1 17,104.5
8. Plus own-account and purchased IPP (Ib) Io + Ip 2.0 931.1
9. Equals: Value added, post-revision (L. 3−6) (Q+ Io)−M 216.1 18,035.6
10. Compensation of Employees W 110.4 8,929.2
11. Gross operating surplus (GOS), pre-revision (L. 7−10) Q− (M+Ip)−W 103.7 8,175.3
12. Plus own-account and purchased IPP (Ib) Io + Ip 2.0 931.1
13. Equals: GOS, post-revision (L. 9−10) (Q+ Io)−M −W 105.7 9,106.4
14. Depreciation, pre-revision D 16.3 1,931.6
15. Plus depreciation of business IPP DIb 1.4 794.2
16. Equals: Depreciation, post-revision D +DIb 17.7 2,725.8
17. Net operating surplus (NOS), pre-revision (L. 11−14): Q− (M+Ip)−W −D 87.4 6,243.7
18. Plus own-account and purchased IPP (Ib) Io + Ip 2.0 931.1
19. Less depreciation of IPP DIb 1.4 794.2
20. Equals: NOS, post-revision (L. 13−16) (Q+ Io)−M −W − (D +DIb) 88.0 6,380.6
Notes: All data were retrieved from the BEA in Sep. 25, 2019. Gross output, intermediate input expenditure,
and value added refer to all private industries obtained from the BEA Industry Accounts for 1947-2018. The
compensation of employees for all private industries is available from the BEA NIPA Table 6.2 for 1929-2018.
The depreciation for the business sector is obtained from Table 3.4 in the BEA Fixed Asset Tables (FAT). Own
account Investment is obtained from the BEA R&D Satellite Account for 1987-2007. We apply the average ratio
of own account R&D investment to private investment on R&D for the sample period 1987-2007 (i.e., 0.74) to
the aggregate investment on IPP in the BEA to obtain own account and purchased IPP for 1947-2018.
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1. Personal consumption expenditure, pre-revision C 77.4 14,002.8
2. Less: NPISH net investment in IPP Inp −DInp 0 4.1
3. Equals: Personal consumption expenditure, post-revision C − (Inp −DInp) 77.4 13,998.7
4. Gross private investment, pre-revision X 16.6 2,697.2
5. Plus: Gross private investment in IPP Ib + Inp 0.6 931.1
6. Equals: Gross private investment, post-revision X + Ib + Inp 17.2 3,628.3
Government sector:
7. Government consumption, pre-revision Cg 6.8 2,913.4
8. Less: Government net investment in IPP Ig −DIg 0.1 9.1
9. Equals: Government consumption, post-revision Cg − (Ig −DIg) 6.7 2,904.3
10. Gross government investment, pre-revision Xg 2.8 478.1
11. Plus: Gross government investment in IPP Ig 0.1 209.1
12. Equals: Gross government investment, post-revision Xg + Ig 2.9 687.2
13. Government expenditure, pre-revision (L. 7+10) G 9.6 3,391.5
14. Plus: Government depreciation in IPP DIg 0 200.0
15. Equals: Government expenditure, post-revision (L. 9+12) G+DIg 9.6 3,591.5
Gross domestic product, GDP :
16. GDP , pre-revision (L. 1+4+13) C +X +G 104.0 19,453.2
17. Plus: Business investment in IPP Ib 0.6 903.5
18. Plus: NPISH depreciation in IPP DInp 0 23.5
19. Plus: Government depreciation in IPP DIg 0 200.0
20. Equals: GDP , post-revision (L. 3+6+15) C + (X + Ib +DInp) + (G+DIg) 104.6 20,580.2
Notes: All data were retrieved from the BEA in Sep. 25, 2019. Personal consumption expenditure, C, gross
private domestic investment X, government expenditure (including consumption and gross investment), G, and
GDP come from NIPA Table 1.1.5 and 3.9.5. We ignore net exports of goods and services from GDP in
this illustrative Table because these are unaffected by IPP capitalization. Our quantitative analysis in Section 3
incorporates net exports. Business, NPISH, and government’s gross investment in IPP come from the Fixed Asset
Tables 2.7 and 7.5, and their depreciation from the Fixed Asset Tables 2.4 and 7.3.
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